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minilateral	 institutions	wherein	 limited	numbers	of	 states	 (and	potentially	 also	other	 actors)	 come	 to-
gether	to	cooperate	on	taking	action	against	climate	change.	
To	 provide	 a	 theoretical	 grounding,	 this	 paper	 first	 discusses	 in	 general	 how	 international	 institutions	
may	 to	 address	 issues	 such	 as	 climate	 change.	 This	 discussion	 is	 based	on	 the	 concept	 of	 governance	
functions	introduced	in	Deliverable	4.1	of	this	project.	The	paper	subsequently	reviews	existing	literature	
on	climate	clubs	and	synthesises	 its	main	findings	on	why	international	climate	policy	 is	progressing	so	
slowly	and	how	climate	 clubs	may	help	 to	 remedy	 the	 situation.	 The	overview	develops	a	 typology	of	
clubs	and	summarises	what	tasks	and	features	are	being	envisaged	for	clubs	in	the	literature.	This	paper	
then	compares	the	features	of	climate	clubs	to	the	governance	functions	introduced	in	Deliverable	4.1.	
This	section	will	discuss	generically	 to	what	extent	governance	 functions	may	be	delivered	by	clubs.	 In	
the	next	step,	this	article	builds	on	the	analysis	of	sectoral	governance	needs	developed	in	Deliverables	
4.1	and	4.2.	The	scope	of	much	of	the	literature	on	climate	clubs	has	so	far	been	limited	by	casting	cli-




electricity,	 land	 transport	 and	 energy-intensive	 industry	 sectors.	 On	 this	 basis,	 the	 article	 examines	



















• Transparency	&	Accountability:	 International	 institutions	may	enhance	 the	 transparency	of	 the	
actions	 taken	by	 their	members	by	 collecting	 and	 analysing	 relevant	 data,	 and	 identifying	 and	
addressing	problems	in	implementation	of	agreed	rules/standards.	
• Means	 of	 Implementation:	 International	 institutions	 may	 organise	 the	 provision	 of	 capacity	































Pigou	 (1920),	Knight	 (1924),	Tiebout	 (1956),	Wiseman	(1957),	Olson	 (1965)	and	Buchanan	 (1965),	with	
Buchanan	generally	seen	as	the	founder	of	club	theory.	The	main	goal	of	‘Buchanan	clubs’	is	the	produc-
tion	 and	 allocation	 of	 goods	 produced	 by	 the	 club.	 Buchanan	 clubs	 are	 essentially	 arrangements	 for	
“consumption-ownership	membership”	with	club	members	owning	and	consuming	these	goods.	 In	Bu-





of	 questions	 relating	 to	 club	 theory,	 e.g.	 to	 capacity	 constraints	 causing	 uncertain	 use	 (e.g.	 Sandler,	
Sterbenz,	&	Tschirhart,	1985),	the	cost	of	transactions	and	exclusion	(Helsley	&	Strange,	1991),	and	the	



























tive	 for	 countries	 to	 free	 ride	 (Hovi,	 Sprinz,	 Saelen,	&	Underdal,	 2014;	D.	Victor,	 2011).	Barrett	 (2016)	
argues	that	collective	action	on	climate	change	is	fundamentally	made	difficult	by	the	uncertainty	about	
thresholds	 in	 the	climate	system,	so-called	 tipping	points,	at	which,	when	exceeded,	 the	climate	could	







achieve	 commitments	 from	 countries	 to	 limit/reduce	 their	 emissions	 sufficiently	 to	 avoid	 dangerous	
climate	 change	 (Rennkamp	&	Marquard,	 2017).	 In	particular,	 climate	 clubs	 are	 suggested	 to	 solve	 the	
free	rider	problem	by	providing	club	benefits	and	sanction	(Barrett	&	Dannenberg,	2016;	Falkner,	2015;	














for	 an	 international	 climate	 treaty	 to	 do.	 Moreover,	 linking	 potential	 climate	 clubs	 to	 existing	 non-
climate	 transnational	 institutions	 could,	 on	 the	one	hand,	 lead	 to	 learning-effects	 concerning	 transna-
tional	cooperation	and,	on	the	other	hand,	help	capitalize	on	powerful	nations	favouring,	or	at	least	ac-






• Buchanan	 climate	 clubs	where	 the	actions	 taken	are	 inherently	 attractive	and	emission	 reduc-
tions	are	a	‘co-benefit’;	
• ‘Voluntary’	climate	clubs	where	countries	take	action	beyond	what	would	maximise	their	direct	



































mitigation	 action	 that	 go	 beyond	 the	 level	 that	 would	 maximise	 members’	 immediate	 material	 self-
interest.	Without	non-climate	club	goods	being	the	main	incentive	for	membership,	however,	free	riding	
becomes	 a	 key	 challenge.	 Voluntary	 clubs	 must	 therefore	 offer	 excludable	 benefits	 for	 encouraging	
membership	and	for	inducing	members	to	contribute	more	to	the	production	of	the	public	good.	In	the	









and/or	relatively	high	damage	costs	would	be	most	 likely	to	 initiate	a	climate	club,	 joined	by	countries	
with	comparable	abatement	or	damage	costs	(Hovi,	Sprinz,	Saelen,	&	Underdal,	2014).	By	contrast,	‘re-


















Barrett	 (2003),	 points	 out	 that	 linkages	 to	 technology	 research	 and	 development	 have	 been	made	 in	
existing	 international	agreements	such	as	 the	Montreal	Protocol,	but	have	nevertheless	not	prevented	
members	from	sharing	such	research	and	development	with	non-members	as	this	would	go	against	their	









odologies.	 Such	 clubs	 have	 no	 enforcement	mechanisms	 and	membership	 is	 fluid.	 Thus,	 pseudo-clubs	
may	only	lead	to	minimal	reputational	benefits,	at	best.	However,	they	may	attract	a	considerably	wider	
range	of	participants	than	clubs	with	binding	substantive	commitments,	may	provide	broad	networking	





















Much	of	 the	 literature	on	climate	clubs	 sees	 climate	change	as	a	 collective	action	dilemma.	While	 the	
optimal	outcome	 for	 all	 countries	would	be	achieved	 if	 all	 cooperated,	 the	 costs	of	mitigating	 climate	
change	 creates	 a	 strong	 incentive	 for	 countries	 to	 free	 ride.	 The	 literature	 suggests	 Buchanan	 climate	
clubs	to	overcome	this	problem	by	focusing	on	actions	that	yield	strong	non-climate	benefits	and	‘volun-
tary’	 climate	 clubs	 to	 overcome	 the	 free-riding	 incentive	 by	 providing	 access	 to	 club	 goods	 and	 using	







































and	 subsequently	 discuss	 how	 international	 cooperation	 may	 in	 theory	 help	 to	 foster	 potentials	 and	
overcome	barriers.	On	this	basis,	the	section	will	review	to	what	extent	international	cooperation	is	ac-
tually	already	promoting	mitigation	 in	 these	sectors.	To	 the	extent	 that	 international	governance	does	
not	yet	provide	the	necessary	support,	the	paper	will	subsequently	discuss	whether	climate	clubs	may	fill	
these	gaps.	











In	 addition,	 technology	 costs	 of	 alternative	 propulsion	 systems	 have	 decreased	 substantially	 in	 recent	
years.	Marginal	abatement	costs	may	even	end	up	negative,	especially	if	electricity	for	electric	vehicles	is	
sourced	 from	 low-carbon	 power	 systems.	 In	 addition,	 while	 investment	 requirements	 for	 establishing	





case.	A	major	 share	of	 funding	 for	 sustainable	 transport	may	 therefore	be	derived	by	 shifting	 funding	
from	unsustainable	transport	(Sims	et	al.,	2014).	
Institutional	and	political	barriers	are	therefore	much	more	pertinent	in	this	sector	than	economic	costs.	








reational)	 separate.	The	result	 is	a	higher	need	to	 travel	 for	various	needs.	Another	practice	 is	priority	
provision	of	urban	space	for	automobile-friendly	infrastructure,	such	as	parking	spaces	and	road	capaci-
ties	(United	Nations	Human	Settlements	Programme,	2013).		
In	 terms	of	 industrial	 paradigms,	many	 traditional	 car	makers	made	 substantial	 investment	 in	 internal	
combustion	engines,	which	create	technological	lock-in	effects	(Skeete,	2017).	In	countries	with	a	strong	








conditions.	While	 US	 authorities	 have	 imposed	 heavy	 penalties,	 this	 has	 not	 been	 the	 case	 in	 the	 EU	
(Luhmann,	2017).	
In	summary,	decarbonisation	of	land	transport	is	to	a	large	extent	not	a	question	of	economic	costs	and	
competition	 between	 countries,	 but	 rather	 a	 question	 of	 competing	 interests	 and	 paradigms	 within	
countries	on	what	transport	modes	and	technologies	to	favour.	
4.3 Electricity	
Macro-economic	 prospects	 of	 mitigation	 action	 in	 the	 electricity	 sector	 are	 broadly	 similar	 to	 land	
transport.	The	economics	of	renewable	electricity	have	changed	fundamentally	over	the	 last	ten	years,	







that	 rely	 economically	 on	 fossil-based	 electricity	 generation.	 These	 actors	 are	 generating	 substantial	



















ment	will	 be	 required,	 an	 RE-based	 power	 system	may	 not	 be	more	 expensive	 than	 the	 conventional	
system.	There	may	be	negative	impacts	on	competitiveness	if	decarbonisation	leads	to	higher	electricity	
prices,	but	such	effects	will	probably	be	temporary	and	can	be	countered	by	policy.		














capture	 and	utilization/storage.	 Second,	 and	 frequently	 related	 to	 the	 first	 option,	 the	 introduction	of	
low-carbon	substitutes	for	materials	and	fuels	is	required,	e.g.	biomass-based	feedstock	or	use	of	waste	











Given	 the	 international	 character	 of	 steel,	 chemicals	 and	 aluminium,	 the	high	 capital	 expenditure	 and	
higher	operating	costs	of	low-emission	technologies	are	a	strong	barrier.		
4.5 Avenues	for	International	Cooperation	
Deliverable	 4.2	 elaborated	 options	 for	 international	 cooperation	 in	 the	 three	 sectors	 discussed	 in	 this	
paper.	 This	 chapter	 synthesises	 the	 sector-specific	 discussions	 from	 Deliverable	 4.2.	 It	 emerges	 that	
while	some	options	are	specific	to	the	individual	sectors,	others	may	be	applied	to	all	sectors.	
As	for	guidance	and	signals,	international	governance	may	directly	or	indirectly	send	signals	on	the	need	
to	 change	 transport	 policy	 and	 planning	 paradigms	 towards	 sustainability.	 International	 governance	
could	explicitly	promulgate	a	new	transport	paradigm,	that	 is,	abandoning	the	traditional	paradigm	fo-
cusing	on	extending	infrastructure	to	cope	with	transport	demand	and	prioritising	individual	motorised	


















by	 legitimate	demands	of	pro-compliance	domestic	 stakeholders	 (Dai,	2010).	 In	 this	way,	 international	










dies	 they	are	providing	 to	 low-emission	activities	on	 the	one	 side,	 and	all	 levies	 they	are	 imposing	on	
low-emission	activities	and	all	subsidies	they	are	providing	to	high-emission	activities	on	the	other	side,	
and	to	commit	to	progressively	shift	resources	from	the	latter	to	the	former	(Verbruggen,	2011).	Coun-

























Transparency	 and	 accountability	 requirements	will	 be	needed	 to	enforce	 compliance	with	 such	 rules.	
International	 governance	may	 establish	 requirements	 to	 provide	 sectorally	 differentiated	 accounts	 of	
national	emissions,	measures	taken	and	their	impacts.	To	ensure	that	any	international	emissions	stand-
ards	or	a	carbon	price	are	effectively	implemented,	reliable	common	monitoring,	reporting	and	verifica-

























The	provision	of	 support	may	also	be	used	as	 a	 lever	 to	 change	high-emission	paradigms	and	deprive	
incumbent	 regime	 actors	 of	 resources.	 Commitments	 to	 ‘climate	 budget	 reform’	 as	 discussed	 above	
could	also	extend	to	the	international	provision	of	means	of	implementation.	That	is,	international	gov-
ernance	 could	 require	 that	 all	 provision	 of	 support	 must	 be	 aligned	 with	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 Paris	
Agreement.		
Finally,	international	governance	can	create	knowledge	and	provide	platforms	for	collective	learning	by	
collecting	 and	 aggregating	 relevant	 data	 and	 information.	 Such	 data	 and	 information	may	 to	 be	 large	
extent	be	made	available	through	transparency	provisions	as	discussed	above.	However,	reporting	does	





Having	 synthesised	 the	demand	 for	 international	governance	 in	 the	decarbonisation	of	 land	 transport,	
electricity	and	energy-intensive	 industry,	this	section	will	discuss	to	what	extent	these	demands	are	al-
ready	being	met	by	existing	institutions.	To	answer	this	question,	Deliverable	4.2	established	a	database	
of	 international	 institutions	 that	 are	 active	 on	 at	 least	 one	 of	 the	 governance	 functions	 introduced	 in	
Deliverable	4.1.	
Generally,	large	numbers	of	institutions	are	active	in	the	land	transport	and	electricity	sectors.	They	in-
clude	 a	 number	 of	 UN	 organisations,	 the	 multilateral	 development	 banks	 and	 several	 city	 networks.	
However,	while	 there	 is	 substantial	number	of	actors,	hardly	any	of	 them	emerge	 saliently	as	hubs	or	




















special	 attention	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 those	 in	 vulnerable	 situations	 (…)”	 (United	Nations,	 2015).	 The	New	
Urban	Agenda	 (NUA)	developed	by	UN	Habitat	 spells	 this	out	 further	 and	 focuses	on	providing	better	
public	 transport,	 tackle	 urban	 challenges,	 increase	 public	 spaces	 and	 takes	 in	 integrated	 policy	 ap-
proaches	(United	Nations,	2016).		
Other	 institutions	 are	 sending	 signals	 that	 are	 specific	 to	 transport,	 but	 these	 have	 limited	 reach	 and	
authority.	In	2016,	the	ITF	launched	the	Decarbonising	Transport	project	to	help	decision	makers	estab-













among	 the	 founding	members	 are	 only	 countries	 that	 have	 limited	 coal	 generation	 capacity	 already.	
Other	institutions	like	the	World	Bank	are	also	supporting	the	phase-out	signal	indirectly	by	turning	away	
from	new	investments	in	fossil	fuel	related	activities.	Yet,	the	pipeline	of	coal	power	plants	is	still	exten-
sive.	 Were	 all	 these	 plants	 to	 be	 built,	 global	 average	 temperature	 rise	 would	 exceed	 the	 2°C	 limit	
(Pfeiffer,	Hepburn,	Vogt-Schilb,	&	Caldecott,	2018).		
Regarding	industry,	the	Cement	Sustainability	Initiative	(CSI)	contributes	to	providing	a	signal	and	guid-
ance	 to	 the	 cement	 sector	 by	 having	 established	 a	 collective	GHG	 emission	 reduction	 target	 of	 20-25	






























some	degree	addresses	 competitiveness	 concerns.	Article	6	of	 the	Paris	Agreement	provides	potential	
avenues	for	countries	to	engage	in	“cooperative	approaches”	which	may	further	facilitate	the	prolifera-
tion	and	harmonization	of	such	 instruments.	To	date,	however,	there	 is	no	real	 international	coordina-
tion	on	carbon	pricing.		
5.4 Transparency	and	Accountability	
The	UNFCCC	 and	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 require	 Parties	 to	 provide	 transparency	 on	 national	 emissions,	
measures	 taken,	 and	 their	 impacts	 in	 the	 form	of	 national	 emission	 inventories,	 national	 communica-






















Furthermore,	 the	 CSI	 and	 the	 International	 Council	 of	 Chemical	 Associations	 (ICCA)	 have	 elaborated	
guidelines	 and	 tools	 for	 their	 respective	membership.	 The	 CSI	 developed	 a	 CO2	 Protocol	 and	 tools	 to	
















































ity	and	transport	 (UNFCCC	Secretariat,	2018).	The	Decarbonising	Transport	project	of	 the	 International	
Transport	Forum	explicitly	aims	to	build	knowledge	in	order	to	help	decision	makers	establish	pathways	
to	carbon-neutral	mobility	(ITF	website,	2019).	Another	example	 is	 IEA’s	Technology	Collaboration	Pro-






tric	 Vehicle	 TCP.	 Their	main	 activities	 focus	 on	 research,	 studies,	 information	 exchange,	 policy	 recom-
mendations	and	establishing	pilot	projects	(IEA	Website,	2019).	
With	the	Global	Stocktake,	the	Paris	Agreement	has	established	a	process	for	collectively	appraising	the	
latest	 science	 and	 progress	 in	 climate	 action	 globally	 every	 5	 years.	 However,	 the	modalities	 for	 the	
































• All	 three	sectors	 feature	 long	 investment	cycles	and	would	therefore	strongly	profit	 from	clear	
long-term	 signals.	 International	 agreement	 on	 sectoral	 emission	 targets	 would	 also	 set	 new	


















Given	 the	 cooperation	gaps	 that	have	been	 identified	 in	 the	preceding	analysis,	 clubs	 in	 these	 sectors	




























The	 signal	 function	of	 international	 cooperation	may	 therefore	be	particularly	 relevant.	 If	 some	actors	
moved	ahead	with	strong	action	in	this	sector,	this	might	contribute	to	changing	the	cost-benefit	percep-
tions	 of	 other	 actors.	 The	 example	 set	 by	 frontrunners	 might	 also	 serve	 as	 political	 support	 for	 pro-
climate	stakeholders	in	recalcitrant	countries.	Club	members	may	also	find	it	to	be	to	their	direct	benefit	
to	 collaborate	 on	 outstanding	 technical	 questions,	 such	 as	 grid	 integration	 and	 storage	 of	 renewable	
electricity.		
However,	 there	are	also	barriers	 to	 the	global	 electricity	 transition	 that	may	not	be	addressed	 from	a	



















initiative	 formation	of	clubs.	Given	that	climate	action	 is	 lagging	even	 in	sectors	with	a	beneficial	cost-
benefit	 ratio	 such	 as	 electricity	 and	 land	 transport,	 this	 assumption	may	 be	 altered	 to	 the	 effect	 that	
countries	 with	 weak	 path	 dependencies	 and	 correspondingly	 low	 perceived	 mitigation	 costs	 may	 be	
most	 likely	 to	 initiate	clubs.	This	assumption	 is	borne	out	by	the	membership	of	 the	PPCA,	as	all	of	 its	




• An	 unequivocal	 joint	 commitment	 to	 reduce	 electricity	 sector	 emissions	 to	 zero,	 not	 just	 to	
phase	out	coal;	
















An	 initial	 list	of	club	 functions	 to	provide	added	value	 to	 the	 institutions	 that	are	already	active	 in	 the	
sector	could	look	very	similar	to	the	electricity	sector:	
• An	unequivocal	joint	commitment	to	reduce	land	transport	emissions	to	zero;	










sales	 of	 conventional	 vehicles	 from	a	 certain	 date.	 There	 already	 is	 some	movement	 in	 this	 direction,	
China,	France,	 India,	the	Netherlands,	Norway,	and	the	UK	have	decided	to	phase	out	or	even	outright	




In	 contrast	 to	 the	 electricity	 and	 land	 transport	 sector,	 decarbonising	 energy-intensive	 industries	 will	


























self-interest.	 For	 such	 clubs	 to	 function	 properly,	 provision	 of	 incentives	 in	 the	 form	 of	 club	
goods	in	the	wide	sense	is	essential.	Suggestions	for	club	goods	include	joint	technology	research	
and	development,	linkage	to	trade	and	border	carbon	adjustments	to	counter	carbon	leakage.			










such	as	 reduction	of	 local	air	pollution	and	attendant	 improvement	of	public	health.	According	 	 to	 the	








tional	production	processes.	 In	addition,	 investments	in	these	industries	are	highly	capital	 intensive.	Fi-
nally,	in	particular	steel	and	chemicals	are	subject	to	strong	international	competition.		
On	this	basis,	the	potential	contributions	clubs	could	make	also	vary	among	the	three	sectors	considered.	
The	 decarbonisation	 of	 energy-intensive	 industries	 requires	more	 effort	 than	would	 be	 warranted	 by	


















only	be	able	 to	 give	 a	 rough	 indication	of	where	 clubs	 could	 go	beyond	 the	 international	 cooperation	
that	 is	already	taking	place.	Further	research	might	address	more	in	detail	what	 international	coopera-
tion	 already	exists	 in	 the	different	 sectors	 and	how	 clubs	might	 add	 value.	 In	 addition,	 this	 paper	has	
addressed	only	three	sectors,	so	further	work	might	expand	this	approach	to	other	sectors.		
	 	
	
COP21	RIPPLES	–	D4.3c		
A	Sectoral	Perspective	on	Climate	Clubs	–	Final	–	30	August	2019	
31	
References	
Ahman,	M.,	Lechtenbohmer,	S.,	Nilsson,	L.	J.,	&	Schneider,	C.	(2016).	Decarbonising	the	Energy	Intensive	
Basic	Materials	Industry	through	Electrification	-	Implications	for	Future	EU	Electricity	Demand.	
Energy,	115(3),	1623–1631.	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2016.07.110	
Alam,	M.	S.,	Hyde,	B.,	Duffy,	P.,	&	McNabola,	A.	(2017).	Assessment	of	pathways	to	reduce	CO	2	emis-
sions	from	passenger	car	fleets:	Case	study	in	Ireland.	Applied	Energy,	189,	283–300.	
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.12.062	
Andresen,	S.	(2014).	Exclusive	Approaches	to	Climate	Governance:	More	Effective	than	the	UNFCCC?	In	
Cherry,	T.L.,	J.	Hovi	and	D.M.	McEvoy	(eds),	Toward	a	New	Climate	Agreement:	Conflict,	Resolu-
tion	and	Governance.	London:	Routledge.	
Banister,	D.	(2008).	The	sustainable	mobility	paradigm.	Transport	Policy,	15(2),	73–80.	
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2007.10.005	
Barrett,	S.	(2003).	Environment	and	Statecraft:	The	Strategy	of	Environmental	Treaty-	Making.	Oxford:	
Oxford	University	Press.	
Barrett,	S.	(2016).	Collective	Action	to	Avoid	Catastrophe:	When	Countries	Succeed,	When	They	Fail,	and	
Why.	Global	Policy,	7.	https://doi.org/doi:	10.1111/1758-5899.12324	
Barrett,	S.,	&	Dannenberg,	A.	(2016).	An	Experimental	Investigation	into	‘Pledge	and	Review’	in	Climate	
Negotiations.	Climatic	Change,	138(1).	https://doi.org/DOI:	10.1007/s10584-016-1711-4	
Buchanan,	J.	M.	(1965).	An	Economic	Theory	of	Clubs.	Economica,	32(125),	1–14.	
https://doi.org/10.2307/2552442	
Canitez,	F.	(2019).	Pathways	to	sustainable	urban	mobility	in	developing	megacities:	A	socio-technical	
transition	perspective.	Technological	Forecasting	and	Social	Change.	
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2019.01.008	
Chrisafis,	A.,	&	Vaughan,	A.	(2017,	July	6).	France	to	ban	sales	of	petrol	and	diesel	cars	by	2040.	The	
Guardian.	
Dai,	X.	(2010).	Global	regime	and	national	change.	Climate	Policy,	10(6),	622–637.	
https://doi.org/10.3763/cpol.2010.0146	
Damert,	M.,	&	Rudolph,	F.	(2018).	Policy	options	for	a	decarbonisation	of	passenger	cars	in	the	EU.	Rec-
ommendations	based	on	a	literature	review.	Wuppertal:	Wuppertal	Institute	for	Climate,	Envi-
ronment	and	Energy.	
De	Cian,	E.,	Parrado,	R.,	Coindoz,	L.,	Mathy,	S.,	Stolyarova,	E.,	Georgiev,	A.,	…	Grubb,	M.	(2017).	A	review	
ofcompetitiveness,	carbon	leakage	and	EU	policyoptions	in	the	post-Paris	landscape	(Deliverable	
No.	3.1).	Retrieved	from	COP21	RIPPLES	Project	(Horizon2020)	website:	
https://www.cop21ripples.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/RIPPLES_D3.1.pdf	
European	Commission.	(2018).	In-Depth	Analysis	in	Support	of	the	Commission	Communcation	
COM(2018)	773.	A	Clean	Planet	for	all	-	A	European	long-term	strategic	vision	for	a	prosperous,	
modern,	competitive	and	climate	neutral	economy.	Supplementary	information.	Retrieved	from	
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/strategies/2050/docs/long-
term_analysis_in_depth_analysis_figures_en.pdf	
	
COP21	RIPPLES	–	D4.3c		
A	Sectoral	Perspective	on	Climate	Clubs	–	Final	–	30	August	2019	
32	
Falkner,	R.	(2015).	Towards	minilateralism.	Nature	Climate	Change,	5,	805–806.	
Fraser,	C.	D.,	&	Hollander,	A.	(1990).	On	Membership	in	Clubs.	Warwick	Economic	Research	Papers	No.	
346.	Retrieved	from	https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/1989-
1994/twerp346.pdf	
Global	Commission	on	the	Economy	and	Climate.	(2015).	Seizing	the	Global	Opportunity:	Partnerships	for	
Better	Growth	and	a	Better	Climate.	Retrieved	from	Global	Commission	on	the	Economy	and	
Climate	website:	https://newclimateeconomy.report/2015/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/2014/08/NCE-2015_Seizing-the-Global-Opportunity_web.pdf	
Green,	J.	(2017).	The	strength	of	weakness:	pseudo-clubs	in	the	climate	regime.	Climatic	Change.	
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-015-1481-4	
Helsley,	R.	W.,	&	Strange,	W.	C.	(1991).	Exclusion	and	the	Theory	of	Clubs.	The	Canadian	Journal	of	Eco-
nomics,	24(4),	888.	https://doi.org/10.2307/135699	
Hirsch,	T.	(2015).	Learning	from	the	&quot;Energiewende&quot;	-	What	Developing	Countries	Expect	
from	Germany	[Study].	Berlin:	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.	
Hovi,	J.,	Sprinz,	D.	F.,	Saelen,	H.,	&	Underdal,	A.	(2014).	The	Club	Approach:	A	Gateway	to	Effective	Cli-
mate	Cooperation?	[Paper	to	be	presented	at	the	ISA	Annual	Conference].	March	2014.	
Hovi,	J.,	Sprinz,	D.	F.,	Sælen,	H.,	&	Underdal,	A.	(2016).	Climate	change	mitigation:	a	role	for	climate	clubs?	
Palgrave	Communications,	2,	16020.	
IEA.	(2016).	Energy	Technology	Perspectives	2016	-	Towards	Sustainable	Urban	Energy	Systems.	Paris:	
International	Energy	Agency.	
IEA.	(2017).	Real-world	policy	packages	for	sustainable	energy	transitions:	Shaping	energy	transition	poli-
cies	to	fit	national	objectives	and	constraints.	Paris:	International	Energy	Agency	(IEA).	
IEA	Website.	(2019).	Transport	Technology	Collaboration	Programmes	(TCPs).	Retrieved	from	
https://www.iea.org/topics/transport/transporttechnologycollaborationprogrammes/	
IEA/OECD.	(2018).	Update	on	Recent	Progress	in	Reform	of	Inefficient	Fossil	Fuel	Subsidies	taht	Encour-
age	Wasteful	Consumption.	Retrieved	from	http://www.oecd.org/fossil-
fuels/publication/update-progress-reform-fossil-fuel-subsidies-g20.pdf	
IRENA.	(2018).	Global	Energy	Transformation:	A	Roadmap	to	2050	(p.	76).	Retrieved	from	International	
Renewable	Energy	Agency	website:	http://irena.org/publications/2018/Apr/Global-Energy-
Transition-A-Roadmap-to-2050	
ITF	website.	(2019).	Decarbonising	Transport	ITF.	Retrieved	from	https://www.itf-
oecd.org/decarbonising-transport	
Kim,	S.	E.,	&	Urpelainen,	J.	(2013).	International	energy	lending:	who	funds	fossil	fuels,	who	funds	energy	
access	for	the	poor?	International	Environmental	Agreements:	Politics,	Law	and	Economics,	13(4),	
411–423.	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-012-9197-7	
Knight,	F.	H.	(1924).	Some	Fallacies	in	the	Interpretation	of	Social	Cost.	The	Quarterly	Journal	of	Econom-
ics,	38(4),	582.	https://doi.org/10.2307/1884592	
	
COP21	RIPPLES	–	D4.3c		
A	Sectoral	Perspective	on	Climate	Clubs	–	Final	–	30	August	2019	
33	
Larsen,	G.,	Smith,	C.,	Krishnan,	N.,	Weischer,	L.,	Bartosch,	S.,	&	Fekete,	H.	(2018).	Towards	Paris	Align-
ment.	How	the	Multilateral	Development	Banks	Can	Better	Support	the	Paris	Agreement.	Re-
trieved	from	World	Resources	Institute,	NewClimate	Institute,	Germanwatch,	Fundación	Andina	
website:	
https://germanwatch.org/sites/germanwatch.org/files/MDBs%20and%20Paris%20Report.pdf	
Luhmann,	H.-J.	(2017).	Europas	Staatsversagen	im	Abgas-Fall.	Eine	„race	to	the	bottom“	aus	dem	Lehr-
buch.	Gesellschaft	•	Wirtschaft	•	Politik,	(2),	173–179.	
Mathiesen,	K.	(2019,	May	20).	Australia’s	coal	communities,	ignored	by	Labor,	deliver	brutal	election	
defeat.	Retrieved	22	August	2019,	from	Climate	Home	News	website:	
https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/05/20/australias-coal-communities-ignored-labor-
deliver-brutal-election-defeat/	
Meckling,	J.,	&	Nahm,	J.	(2019).	The	politics	of	technology	bans:	Industrial	policy	competition	and	green	
goals	for	the	auto	industry.	Energy	Policy,	126,	470–479.	
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.11.031	
Multilateral	Development	Banks.	(2018).	The	MDBs’	alignment	approach	to	the	objectives	of	the	Paris	
Agreement:	working	together	to	catalyse	low-emissions	and	climate-resilient	development.	Re-
trieved	from	http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/784141543806348331/Joint-Declaration-MDBs-
Alignment-Approach-to-Paris-Agreement-COP24-Final.pdf	
Nordhaus,	W.	(2015).	Climate	Clubs:	Overcoming	Free-riding	in	International	Climate	Policy.	American	
Economic	Review,	105(4),	1339–1370.	http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.15000001	
Obergassel,	W.,	Arens,	C.,	Hermwille,	L.,	Kreibich,	N.,	Mersmann,	F.,	Ott,	H.	E.,	&	Wang-Helmreich,	H.	
(2016).	Phoenix	from	the	ashes:	an	analysis	of	the	Paris	Agreement	to	the	United	Nations	
Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change.	Part	II.	Environmental	Law	&	Management,	28(01),	
3–12.	
Oberthür,	S.,	Hermwille,	L.,	Khandekar,	G.,	Obergassel,	W.,	Rayner,	T.,	Wyns,	T.,	…	Melkie,	M.	(2017).	Key	
concepts,	core	challenges	and	governance	functions	of	international	climate	governance	(Deliv-
erable	No.	4.1).	Retrieved	from	COP21	RIPPLES	Project	(Horizon2020)	website:	
https://www.cop21ripples.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Deliverable-4.1-Ripples-Final2.pdf	
Oberthür,	S.,	Khandekar,	G.,	&	Wyns,	T.	(2019).	International	Governance	for	the	Decarbonization	of	
Energy-	Intensive	Industries:	Great	Potential	Underexploited.	Manuscript	submitted	to	Earth	Sys-
tem	Governance	Journal.	
Olson,	M.	(1965).	The	Logic	of	Collective	Action.	Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press.	
Ott,	H.	E.,	Bauer,	S.,	Brandi,	C.,	Mersmann,	F.,	&	Weischer,	L.	(2016).	Climate	Alliances	après	Paris.	The	
Potential	of	Pioneer	Climate	Alliances	to	Contribute	to	Stronger	Mitigation	and	Transformation.	
Retrieved	from	https://hermann-e-ott.de/cms/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/PACA_paper_2016_WI-1.pd	
Pfeiffer,	A.,	Hepburn,	C.,	Vogt-Schilb,	A.,	&	Caldecott,	B.	(2018).	Committed	emissions	from	existing	and	
planned	power	plants	and	asset	stranding	required	to	meet	the	Paris	Agreement.	Environmental	
Research	Letters,	13(5),	054019.	https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aabc5f	
Pigou,	A.	C.	(1920).	The	Economics	of	Welfare.	London:	Palgrave	MacMillan.	
	
COP21	RIPPLES	–	D4.3c		
A	Sectoral	Perspective	on	Climate	Clubs	–	Final	–	30	August	2019	
34	
PPMC	Website.	(2018a).	PPMC	Common	Framework.	Retrieved	from	http://www.ppmc-
transport.org/common-framework/	
PPMC	Website.	(2018b).	PPMC	Transport	Decarbonisation	Alliance.	Retrieved	from	http://www.ppmc-
transport.org/scaling-up-action-on-transport-and-climate-change-establishment-of-a-transport-
decarbonisation-alliance-tda/	
Prakash,	A.,	&	Potoski,	M.	(2007).	Collective	Action	through	Voluntary	Environmental	Programs:	A	Club	
Theory	Perspective:	Prakash/Potoski:	Collective	Action	through	Voluntary	Environmental	Pro-
grams.	Policy	Studies	Journal,	35(4),	773–792.	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.2007.00247.x	
Rayner,	T.,	Shawoo,	Z.,	Hermwille,	L.,	Obergassel,	W.,	Mersmann,	F.,	Asche,	F.,	…	Zamarioli,	L.	(2018).	
Evaluating	the	Adequacy	of	the	Outcome	of	COP21	in	the	Context	of	the	Development	of	the	
Broader	International	Climate	Regime	Complex.	Retrieved	from	
https://www.cop21ripples.eu/resources/deliverable-4-2/	
Rennkamp,	B.,	&	Marquard,	A.	(2017).	South	Africa’s	multiple	faces	in	current	climate	clubs.	South	Afri-
can	Journal	of	International	Affairs,	24(4),	443–461.	
https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2017.1421479	
Ross	Morrow,	W.,	Gallagher,	K.	S.,	Collantes,	G.,	&	Lee,	H.	(2010).	Analysis	of	policies	to	reduce	oil	con-
sumption	and	greenhouse-gas	emissions	from	the	US	transportation	sector.	Energy	Policy,	38(3),	
1305–1320.	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.11.006	
Sælen,	H.	(2015).	Side-payments:	an	effective	instrument	for	building	climate	clubs?	International	Envi-
ronmental	Agreements:	Politics,	Law	and	Economics,	16(6),	909–932.	
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-015-9311-8	
Sandler,	T.,	Sterbenz,	F.	P.,	&	Tschirhart,	J.	(1985).	Uncertainty	and	Clubs.	Economica,	52(208),	467.	
https://doi.org/10.2307/2553879	
Schwerhoff,	G.,	&	Sy,	M.	(2017).	Financing	renewable	energy	in	Africa	–	Key	challenge	of	the	sustainable	
development	goals.	Renewable	and	Sustainable	Energy	Reviews,	75,	393–401.	
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2016.11.004	
Sims,	R.,	Schaeffer,	R.,	Creutzig,	F.,	Cruz-Núñez,	X.,	D’Agosto,	M.,	Dimitriu,	D.,	…	Tiwari,	G.	(2014).	
Transport.	In	Climate	Change	2014:	Mitigation	of	Climate	Change.	Contribution	of	Working	
Group	III	to	the	Fifth	Assessment	Report	of	the	Intergovern-	mental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	
[Edenhofer,	O.,	R.	Pichs-Madruga,	Y.	Sokona,	E.	Farahani,	S.	Kadner,	K.	Seyboth,	A.	Adler,	I.	Baum,	
S.	Brunner,	P.	Eickemeier,	B.	Kriemann,	J.	Savolainen,	S.	Schlömer,	C.	von	Stechow,	T.	Zwickel	and	
J.C.	Minx	(eds.)].	Cambridge,	United	Kingdom	and	New	York,	NY,	USA:	Cambridge	University	
Press.	
Skeete,	J.-P.	(2017).	Examining	the	role	of	policy	design	and	policy	interaction	in	EU	automotive	emis-
sions	performance	gaps.	Energy	Policy,	104,	373–381.	
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.02.018	
Stewart,	R.	B.,	Oppenheimer,	M.,	&	Rudyk,	B.	(2013).	Building	Blocks	for	Global	Climate	Protection.	Stan-
ford	Environmental	Law	Journal,	32(341).	
Stewart,	R.,	Oppenheimer,	M.,	&	Rudyk,	B.	(2013).	A	new	strategy	for	global	climate	protection.	Climatic	
Change,	120(1),	1–12.	
	
COP21	RIPPLES	–	D4.3c		
A	Sectoral	Perspective	on	Climate	Clubs	–	Final	–	30	August	2019	
35	
Stumpf,	R.	(2017,	July).	U.K.	to	Ban	Internal	Combustion	Engine	Vehicles	by	2040.	Is	the	ICE	age	begin-
ning	to	thaw	in	Europe?	The	Drive.	
SUM4All	Website.	(2019).	Sustainable	Mobility	for	All	|	Available	Indicators.	Retrieved	30	March	2019,	
from	http://datatopics.worldbank.org/sum4all/indicators	
Sweerts,	B.,	Longa,	F.	D.,	&	van	der	Zwaan,	B.	(2019).	Financial	de-risking	to	unlock	Africa’s	renewable	
energy	potential.	Renewable	and	Sustainable	Energy	Reviews,	102,	75–82.	
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2018.11.039	
Tiebout,	C.	M.	(1956).	A	Pure	Theory	of	Local	Expenditures.	Journal	of	Political	Economy,	64(5),	416–424.	
https://doi.org/10.1086/257839	
Transport	Decarbonisation	Alliance.	(2019).	TDA	Charter.	Retrieved	from	http://tda-mobility.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/TDA-Charter-Template.pdf	
Transport	Decarbonisation	Alliance	Website.	(2019).	TDA	Members.	Retrieved	30	March	2019,	from	
Transport	Decarbonisation	Alliance	website:	http://tda-mobility.org/tda-members/	
UNFCCC.	(2018).	Decision	-/CMA.1,	Matters	relating	to	Article	14	of	the	Paris	Agreement	and	paragraphs	
99–101	of	decision	1/CP.21,	Advance	unedited	version.	Retrieved	from	
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp24_auv_GST_L.16.pdf	
UNFCCC	Secretariat.	(2018).	Mitigation	benefits	and	co-benefits	of	policies,	practices	and	actions	for	
enhancing	mitigation	ambition	and	options	for	supporting	their	implementation.	The	social	and	
economic	value	of	carbon	and	the	promotion	of	efficient	public	transport	and	energy	efficiency	
of	vehicles.	Retrieved	from	
http://unfccc.int/resource/climateaction2020/media/1267/161010_mitigation_tp_final.pdf	
United	Nations.	(2015).	Transforming	our	world:	the	2030	Agenda	for	Sustainable	Development,	
A/RES/70/1,	21	October	2015.	
United	Nations.	(2016).	New	Urban	Agenda,	A/RES/71/256,	23	December	2016.	
United	Nations.	(2017a).	Global	indicator	framework	for	the	Sustainable	Development	Goals	and	targets	
of	the	2030	Agenda	for	Sustainable	Development.	Retrieved	from	
https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/Global%20Indicator%20Framework_A.RES.71.313%20An
nex.pdf	
United	Nations.	(2017b).	UN	GA	Resolution	71/313,	Work	of	the	Statistical	Commission	pertaining	to	the	
2030	Agenda	for	Sustainable	Development.	UN	Doc	A/RES/71/313,	10	July	2017.	Retrieved	from	
https://undocs.org/A/RES/71/313	
United	Nations	Human	Settlements	Programme.	(2013).	Planning	and	Design	for	Sustainable	Urban	Mo-
bility.	Global	Report	on	Human	Settlements	2013.	New	York:	Routledge.	
Verbruggen,	A.	(2011).	A	Turbo	Drive	for	the	Global	Reduction	of	Energy-Related	CO2	Emissions.	Sus-
tainability,	3,	632–648.	https://doi.org/10.3390/su3040632	
Victor,	D.	(2011).	Global	Warming	Gridlock.	Creating	More	Effective	Strategies	for	Protecting	the	Planet.	
Cambridge	et	al.:	Cambridge	University	Press.	
	
COP21	RIPPLES	–	D4.3c		
A	Sectoral	Perspective	on	Climate	Clubs	–	Final	–	30	August	2019	
36	
Victor,	D.	G.	(2015).	The	Case	for	Climate	Clubs	[Think	Piece].	Retrieved	from	The	E15	Initiative.	Geneva:	
Internationl	Centre	for	Trade	and	Sustainable	Development	(ICTSD)	and	World	Economic	Forum	
website:	www.e15initiative.org	
Weischer,	L.,	Morgan,	J.,	&	Patel,	M.	(2012).	Climate	Clubs:	Can	Small	Groups	of	Countries	make	a	Big	
Difference	in	Addressing	Climate	Change?	Review	of	European	Community	&	International	Envi-
ronmental	Law,	21(3).	
WHO.	(2018).	COP	24	Special	Report	on	Climate	and	Health.	Retrieved	from	World	Health	Organisation	
(WHO)	website:	https://www.who.int/globalchange/publications/COP24-report-health-climate-
change/en/	
Wiseman,	J.	(1957).	The	Theory	of	Public	Utility	Price	-	An	Empty	Box.	Oxford	Economic	Papers,	9(1),	56–
74.	https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a042273	
World	Bank.	(2017,	December	12).	World	Bank	Group	Announcements	at	One	Planet	Summit.	Retrieved	
19	April	2018,	from	World	Bank	website:	http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2017/12/12/world-bank-group-announcements-at-one-planet-summit	
World	Bank.	(2018).	State	and	Trends	of	Carbon	Pricing	2018.	Retrieved	from	The	World	Bank	website:	
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29687	
World	Bank	Website.	(2015,	December	2).	Joint	Statement	by	the	Multilateral	Development	Banks	on	
Sustainable	Transport	and	Climate	Change	[Text/HTML].	Retrieved	9	May	2018,	from	World	Bank	
website:	http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/12/02/joint-statement-by-
the-multilateral-development-banks-on-sustainable-transport-and-climate-change	
Wright,	H.,	Holmes,	I.,	&	Barbe,	R.	(2017).	Greening	Financial	Flows	–	What	Progress	Has	Been	Made	in	
the	Development	Banks?	Retrieved	from	E3G	website:	
https://www.e3g.org/docs/E3G_Briefing_-_MDB_Climate_vs_Fossil_Finance_-
_FINAL_061017.pdf	
	
